In this paper, we study short term return reversals in the stock market. In our model, each period new investors arrive to the stock market with stochastic endowments, trade and then exit the market. The market makers retain a continuous presence in the stock market and carry over in time investors' order imbalances. The price impact from investors' order imbalances makes prices deviate from fundamentals and due to market makers' inventory considerations, reversals take place only gradually. As the endowments of each generation of investors are stochastic, the market makers' inventories are also stochastic. Time to time the market makers' inventories accumulate to very high levels, implying that the short term expected returns to reversal trades become very high. Simulations show that a stock's expected weekly return depends on its returns during several past days, but so that the effect of more distant days' returns on future returns is smaller. The price impact from trading and the speed of mean reversion depend on the amount of investors and market makers in a nonlinear way.
Introduction
In this paper, we study theoretically the short term return reversal phenomenon. Our paper is related to the literature on liquidity provision starting from Grossman and Miller (1988) . They show that temporary market pressure from investors' portfolio rebalancing can cause prices to deviate from their fundamentals. In their model, this occurs in a setting where investors are risk averse and they arrive sequentially to the market with order imbalances and then exit the market. In their model, a group of risk averse traders, market makers, choose to retain a continuous presence in the market, although this is costly for them, and accommodate other investors' order imbalances and temporarily carry such imbalances over in time until a customer with an opposite investment need arrives. The investors' order imbalances cause a price impact, however, as the market makers must be induced to be counterparties to investors' trades. Our model is in many ways a dynamic extension of their model, where the order imbalances of each period's investors are normally distributed.
In our model, the price impact of investors' order imbalances and the pattern of future reversals depend on the number of market makers and investors in an interesting way. As expected, with large number of market makers the expected price impact from investors' order imbalances is small. If, however, investors unexpectedly bring large order imbalances to the market, the price reversal following the initial price impact from investors' trades takes place only gradually. This occurs as market makers can then sustain large inventories and the risk bearing capacity of each new cohort of investors is small, implying that market makers cannot easily unload their inventories. When the number of market makers is small, on the other hand, the investors' order imbalances have a large but not lasting impact on prices. In this case, the market makers' risk bearing capacity is small, hence there is a large contemporaneous price impact from investors order imbalances. This time, however, the large number of investors that arrive to the market already in the very next period are expected to accommodate most of the few market makers' inventory imbalances, implying a fast reversal. Our model also makes a prediction that there is a larger trading volume in the first case, i.e., in the more liquid markets. We say markets are more liquid, whenever there is a smaller price impact from investors' trades of any given size.
Another feature of our model is that, as in Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) , several days' order imbalances affect stocks expected future returns. In contrast to Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) , our model does not, however, require the assumption of autocorrelated order flows from investors to derive this result. This result follows already from the market makers inventory considerations. Also, our model predicts that past investors' order flows, and past returns, have a gradually declining effect on future returns. Finally, the fact that several days' stochastic order imbalances affect market makers inventories, and expected returns, implies that time to time the expected returns to reversal trades become very large.
One closely related paper studying short term reversals is Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993) . They also set up a model where the temporary market pressure from non informational investors' trades shows up as mean reversion in stock prices in the short run. According to their model, a large trading volume (a measure of order imbalances) should lead to negative autocorrelation in stock returns. Supporting their argument, they find also empirically that that trading volume does reduce the otherwise positive autocorrelation in stock returns for a value weighted index of large US stocks. In our setting the similar result that volume predicts reversals follows in the baseline case where the number of market makers is constant across stocks and over time. If, however, the number of market makers varies across stocks, or for some reason unexpectedly changes over time, the fact that the relationship between volume and reversal depends on the amount of market makers, suggests that in a panel regression there need not be a positive relationship between turnover and reversals. Other theoretical papers with dynamic market maker considerations include e.g., Ho and Stoll (1983) , Kyle (1985) and O'Hara and Oldfield (1986), Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005) and Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) .
Empirically, many papers have studied short term stock return reversals, and many of the papers also relate the phenomenon to liquidity provision. For instance, Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) find evidence of significant return reversals at one month and one week's horizon, respectively. Other papers studying the phenomenon include Conrad et al. (1994) , Cooper (1999) , Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) and Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) . Recently, the research has also focused on the risk bearing ability and portfolio considerations of market makers. Namely, Andrade, Chang and Seasholes (2008) and Hendershott and Seasholes (2007) study cross sectional returns and look at how liquidity shocks to one asset may alter the prices for correlated securities. These papers find support for the idea that market makers' risk considerations are an important factor affecting cross sectional stock returns. In our paper, we study further the risk bearing ability of market makers, theoretically, but in contrast to the above mentioned two papers, we focus on the dynamics of market maker's inventory and risk taking.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we develop the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the equilibrium while section 4 presents some simulation results from the model. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Model
Consider the following model: There are T periods t ∊ {1,…T} and two assets: a risky and a safe asset. The risky asset, stock, pays a periodic dividend
The periodic shock to the dividend, ε t , is observable in the beginning of the period t, at which point the dividend is also immediately paid out. Denoting by P t the end of period t price for the stock, the period t stock return is
The return to the safe asset is r f ≡ R-1.
We assume two types of agents: Long term investors and market makers. First, there are M market makers, who are present in the market in all periods. They have zero endowment of the stock in the beginning of the game. We take the number of market makers, M, as exogenously given, but it can alternatively be thought to be such that the expected lifetime returns to market makers correspond to their lost income from maintaining a continuous presence in the market. For simplicity, we assume that the market makers follow myopic decision rules. All investors who are absent from the market invest all the dividends they receive (borrow money for all dividends they pay in case they are short the asset) at the risk free rate until period T, when they consume their wealth. We assume that the investors assign a CARA utility function for their end of the period T wealth, where a denotes their parameter of risk aversion, and thus maximize
As discussed, the M market makers are myopic and maximize in period t:
Equilibrium prevails when both investors and market makers actions maximize their objective functions, taking as given the strategies of the other market participants, and markets clear.
Equilibrium
In our model, the investors who depart the market at the end of any given period t invest all the dividends they receive (borrow money for all dividends they pay in case they are short the asset) at the risk free rate until period T, when they consume their wealth.
Because of this, the expected period T wealth that comes from buying one share of the risky asset (ex dividend) in period t is:
This is the future value at time T of the expected stream of dividends until period T, assuming the dividends are invested at the risk free rate. The standard deviation of the period T wealth, associated with one share investment in the risky asset in period t is:
At time t, taking as given the stock price P t , an investor i selects his stock holdings, 
Assuming next trading period's price is normally distributed given P t , with mean 
for some x t and y t . Note that in the last period, E T-1 (P T ) + v = v, implying, given (10), that We now conjecture, and verify below, that in the limit where T→∞, there exists x t and y t that are time independent. Let us now try solve for such x and y. If we find such x and y, 
In period T-2, E T-2 (P T-1 ) and P T-2 are linear in
Using (16) in (15), we obtain ( ) 
where 2 2 2 2 ω σ σ
This implies that y is the solution to 
Note that given that the constant term is negative and the highest power is positive, a solution will always exist. When a small enough or M is large enough, the solution for y is unique. Note that when a →0, y→0 and when M→∞, y→0. These results show that if agents are risk neutral, or there are a large amount of market makers, there is no price impact from investors trades (and hence no mean reversion). Note also that when K→∞, y→0, as market makers can expect to unwind even large positions easily the very next day.
Trading volume in the context of our model is:
(23)
Expected price patterns implied by the model
Equation (17) shows that the expected price is a weighted average of the current price, adjusted for the dividend and interest, and the long term average price, v/r. When P t < v/r, E t P t+1 ∈ (P t ,v/r) and similarly when price is above its long run average, so is the expected price in the next period. How persistent the demand shocks are, depends on the amount of investors and market makers amongst other things.
Below we study a numerical example to see the effect of parameters on mean reversion.
In the numerical example we have used following values for the model variables v=0.0015 (7.5% annual dividend yield), r=0.03% (7.8% p.a.), K=100, M=5, a=0.2, Note that in case K increases, the expected initial price impact always increases, as the magnitude of a one standard deviation shock increases. The expected mean reversion, as a percentage of the initial deviation, however, is larger when K is higher. Simulations show also that the trading volume increases as the number of market makers increases, i.e., as the markets become more liquid. The simulation results for M=2, M=5
and M=10 show that trading volume increases monotonically at a decreasing rate as the number of market makers increases and is in our numerical simulation 74% higher in the case where M=10 as opposed to M=2. Another finding is that the autocorrelation in volume is higher in illiquid markets, i.e., when M is small. This result is intuitive as in this case market makers unload their inventories quickly.
Time series properties predicted by the model
Direct empirical testing of our model requires data on market makers, investors and order imbalances. The model does however make predictions about the general pattern of mean reversion that we should expect to see in the data. First, as our simulations below confirm, according to the model, prices deviate from fundamentals due to liquidity shocks, but drift towards the fundamentals gradually over time. The expected mean reversion is gradual as several generations of investors are typically needed to accommodate the order imbalances that are carried in market makers inventory. Second, the deviations from fundamentals depend not only on today's liquidity shocks but also, to a decreasing degree, on several previous days liquidity shocks. Thus the periods with highest degree of expected mean reversion follow periods where prices have moved away from fundamentals on several days in a row.
Below we simulate daily returns for the stock in order to study the expected mean reversion in weekly returns. Our expectation is that the model predicts that several day's returns affect the expected returns during the next week. In the simulations below we have used the same base case scenario values for the model as in the previous exercise. Define . For the simulated data we run the following regression
That is, the future 5 day returns are regressed on each of the previous five day's returns. Simulated regressions suggest first that we should expect to see most recent price movements having a larger impact on expected returns. Second, it is likely that several past day's returns are significant in explaining future returns. This is the case especially when K is sufficiently large, but not too large when compared to M. This is reflected in the fact that in Figure 4 , the past days returns affect the most in the case where K = 100.
As these simulations show, the relationship between expected returns and past day's returns coefficients is nonlinear. This nonlinearity is also reflected in the fact that the past day's returns coefficients decrease when moving from M=2 to M=5 if K=100, but increase if K = 500, as can be verified by comparing figures 4 and 5. The intuition why mean reversion can be faster when M is small is that in this case, the market makers collectively carry over only small imbalances, which thus have only little impact on future prices, especially when the number of investors is large.
The predictions of simulations can be summarized as follows: In an econonometric analysis, the model predicts that when regressing z-day future abnormal returns from the close on day t, z t R + , with past abnormal returns, 
expected mean reversion, but in a manner where the most recent returns affect the most.
Other predictions of the model are that the pattern of expected mean reversion depends on K and M and second that trading volume is increasing in liquidity.
Conclusion
In this paper we presented a structural model of mean reversion in the stock market. The main results obtained are that expected mean reversion is gradual and depends on several past days returns to a decreasing degree. We also showed that the patterns of expected mean reversion depend on the relative proportions of long term investors and market makers.
In our model we assumed that the volatility of prices and noise trading is the same across all weekdays. It is plausible to think, however, there is more both information and liquidity trading on Mondays, implying that especially on Fridays market makers are reluctant to take positions. It is easy to adjust the theory to take into account differences across weekdays although obtaining a closed form solution is no longer possible. We hope to study the weekday effects in our future research.
